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ALASKA’S RESPONSES TO THE 
BLAKELY CASE 
TERESA W. CARNS* 
Following the 2004 Supreme Court decision in Blakely v. 
Washington, states were forced to change their sentencing 
practices.  In the wake of the Blakely decision, Alaska has 
experienced changes such as new sentencing laws, new appeals, 
and courts of appeals decisions that have raised new legal issues. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The June 24, 2004 United States Supreme Court decision in 
Blakely v. Washington1 has changed sentencing practices across the 
United States.  The purpose of this brief comment is to describe 
some of the changes in Alaska that flowed from the decision.  
These changes have included new sentencing laws, a continuing 
stream of new appeals, and Alaska Court of Appeals decisions that 
have further unsettled the legal landscape. 
With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority, the Court 
in Blakely held that a defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial on factual findings that would increase the defendant’s 
sentence, rather than allowing judicial decisions at a lower standard 
of evidence to increase the sentence.2  In her dissent, Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor noted that Alaska and several other states had 
sentencing systems that would be rendered unconstitutional by the 
majority decision.3  Alaska’s presumptive sentencing scheme was 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision because it allowed judges 
to impose aggravated sentences for certain factors of the crime that 
 
 * Senior Staff Associate, Alaska Judicial Council, Anchorage, Alaska; B.A., 
Kalamazoo College, 1967. 
 1. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 2. Id. at 304, 313–14. 
 3. Id. at 323.  Part IV.A of Justice O’Connor’s dissent cites Alaska as one of 
several states that “have enacted guidelines systems . . . . Today’s decision casts 
constitutional doubt over them all . . . .” Id.; see ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 (2003) 
(current version at ALASKA STAT.§ 12.55.155 (2006)). 
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had not been presented to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.4 
An earlier Supreme Court case, Apprendi v. New Jersey,5 set 
the stage for the Blakely decision.  In Apprendi, the Court said: 
“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”6  The Court’s majority decision in Blakely held that the 
Washington trial judge’s decision to impose extra time for an 
aggravating factor in the defendant’s kidnapping case violated the 
same Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as had the trial judge’s 
decision in Apprendi.7  
II.  ALASKA’S INITIAL RESPONSES 
Alaska prosecutors immediately took action in 2004 to comply 
with the new requirements. They started to present potential 
aggravating factors to grand juries for indictment.8  If the 
aggravators were approved by the grand jury, or were added later 
in the case, prosecutors presented them at the jury trial.9 Most 
cases continued to be negotiated; in these, prosecutors asked for a 
Blakely waiver when appropriate.10 
Early on, one judge found Alaska’s presumptive sentencing 
system unconstitutional as a result of Blakely.11  Judge Michael 
Wolverton in Anchorage said in a 2004 opinion that “the most 
appropriate resolution of the issues at this juncture, and until the 
Alaska Legislature has had the opportunity to remedy the myriad 
concerns raised by Blakely v. Washington (citation omitted), is to 
declare that Alaska’s presumptive sentencing scheme as set forth in 
Title 12 is unconstitutional.”12 Judge Wolverton based his decision 
 
 4. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155. 
 5. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 6. Id. at 490. 
 7. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303–05. 
 8. Blakely in Alaska, THE SENTENCING GUIDELINE (National Association of 
Sentencing Commissions, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2005, at 3, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/states/NASC_030205.pdf.  The section in the newsletter is 
based on an interview with Susan Parkes, Deputy Attorney General for Criminal 
Affairs.  Interview information available from the Alaska Judicial Council. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id.; see ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(f)(2) (2006). 
 11. State v. Herrmann, No. 3AN-S02-11320-CR (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 
2004). 
 12. Id. at 1. 
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in part on a Utah federal case, United States v. Croxford,13 in which 
the court said that its only viable option was to treat the U.S. 
guidelines “as unconstitutional in their entirety . . . and sentence 
Croxford between the statutory minimum and maximum.”14 
On August 4, 2006, the court of appeals vacated Judge 
Wolverton’s decision and remanded the case to the superior court 
for sentencing.15  The court said: 
It is true that Alaska’s pre-2005 presumptive sentencing law is 
flawed in certain respects.  Specifically, some of the provisions of 
the pre-2005 sentencing law do not comply with the right to jury 
trial . . . . Because Herrmann has not shown that he is prejudiced 
by any of the Blakely flaws in our pre-2005 presumptive 
sentencing law, the superior court decided a purely hypothetical 
controversy when it declared the entire pre-2005 presumptive 
sentencing law to be unconstitutional.16 
The State’s most important response was a new sentencing 
plan filed at the beginning of the 2005 legislative session.17  In 
essence, the new law replaced the single presumptive sentences 
with a range of presumptive sentences for each offense and 
codified the right to jury trial for alleged aggravators.18 The 
legislature passed the bill quickly, and it became effective when 
Governor Murkowski signed it on March 22, 2005.19 
Alaskans varied in their responses to the legislation. The 
governor’s press release said that “[j]udges will have the discretion 
to weigh the facts and circumstances of individual defendants to 
determine an appropriate sentence within the presumptive 
range.”20  The Department of Law, chief drafters of the new bill, 
said that the sentencing ranges adopted by legislators were “in 
keeping with the spirit of the [U.S.] Supreme Court decision.”21  
Defense attorneys observed that the new legislation would result in 
more incarceration for defendants by subjecting them to higher 
sentences based on less evidence.22  They noted that defendants 
 
 13. 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (D. Utah 2004). 
 14. Id. at 1242. 
 15. State v. Herrmann, 140 P.3d 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
 16. Id. at 895–96. 
 17. See S.B. 56, 2005 Leg., 24th Sess. (Alaska 2005). 
 18. See id. 
 19. Press Release, Governor Frank Murkowski, Murkowski Signs Bill Fixing 
Criminal Sentencing Statutes (Mar. 22, 2005), available at 
http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/press/pr-blakely-signing.pdf. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Matt Volz, Judges Get More Sentencing Leeway, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Mar. 23, 2005, at B5. 
 22. Id. 
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would be more reluctant to plead guilty because sentences in 
negotiated cases would be less certain.23 
III.  TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF  
PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING - 1980 TO 2005 
Alaska courts began to structure judicial sentencing decisions 
with one of the supreme court’s earliest sentence appeals.24  In State 
v. Chaney,25 the court required judges to consider the seriousness of 
the offense, the offender’s prior record, likelihood of rehabilitation, 
protection of the public, harm to the victim and the community, 
deterrence, community condemnation and reaffirmation of societal 
norms, and restoration of the victim and the community.26  For the 
next several years, the court referred frequently to these criteria in 
its sentencing decisions.27 
In 1978, Alaska’s legislature adopted a criminal code paired 
with a presumptive sentencing scheme that replaced the former 
indeterminate sentencing system.28  Both the code and the 
sentencing system took effect on January 1, 1980.29  Derived from 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. In 1969, the legislature granted the Alaska Supreme Court authority to 
review the length of trial court sentences.  See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(a) 
(2006). 
 25. 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970). 
 26. Id. at 443. 
 27. E.g., State v. Graybill, 695 P.2d 725, 727 (Alaska 1985) (“We reverse the 
court of appeals and reinstate the original sentence based on the trial judge’s 
discretion under the Chaney criteria . . . .”). 
 28. For a detailed discussion of the then-new legislation see Barry Stern, 
Presumptive Sentencing in Alaska, 2 ALASKA L. REV. 227 (1985). 
Until the presumptive sentencing legislation took effect on January 1, 1980, 
Alaska statutes called for judges to impose a specific term for a sentence within 
broad ranges. Once the term was imposed, other statutes governed parole 
eligibility and good time, but the defendant would not serve more than the specific 
sentence imposed by the judge.  Judges could suspend part or all of the sentence.  
Under presumptive sentencing, the statutes called for either a sentence within a 
statutory minimum/maximum range (most first felony offender Class B and C), or 
the imposition of a specified presumptive sentence (more serious or repeat 
offenders).  The system could be categorized as a “mixed” system, combining a 
structured sentencing system and an indeterminate system (because discretionary 
parole still operated under specific circumstances).  See Jon Wool, Beyond 
Blakely: Implications of the Booker Decision for State Sentencing Systems, 2005 
VERA INST. OF JUST. STATE SENTENCING AND CORR. POL’Y & PRAC. REV. 2 (Feb. 
2005). 
 29. See Stern, supra note 28 at 230 n.9.  The Judicial Council, at the request of 
the legislature, reported on 1974–1976 felony sentencing patterns throughout the 
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work by the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal 
Sentencing,30 presumptive sentencing called for a combination of 
structured sentencing and judicial discretion.31 
Presumptive sentencing set a single term that, absent other 
factors, was presumed to be the appropriate sentence.  The new 
sentences applied to repeat Class B and C (lesser) offenders, to all 
Class A felons, and to unclassified felons convicted of sexual 
offenses.32  Presumptive sentences for subsequent felony offenders 
in all categories also had presumptive sentences specified by law, 
with statutory aggravators and mitigators available to adjust the 
sentences.33 
First offenders convicted of Class B and C felonies did not 
have presumptive sentences,34 and they were eligible for 
discretionary parole after they had served one-third of the active 
 
state to provide a basis for the Criminal Code Commission’s work.  See ALASKA 
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING PATTERNS: A MULTIVARIATE 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (1977), available at 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/akfel74.pdf [hereinafter ALASKA FELONY 
SENTENCING].  At the request of the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission, the 
Council reviewed other possible sentencing schemes, including mandatory 
minimums and flat time, and recommended that presumptive sentencing be 
adopted. 
 30. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, 
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976). 
 31. Stern, supra note 28, at 227. 
 32. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT.  § 
12.55.125 (2006)).  A handful of the most serious offenses had mandatory 
minimum sentences and fell outside of the presumptive sentencing scheme.  The 
legislature assigned a twenty-year minimum for Murder 1, § 12.55.125(a) (1980) 
(current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a) (2006)), a ten-year minimum for 
Murder 2, and a five-year minimum for  Kidnapping, § 12.55.125(b) (1980) 
(current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(b) (2006)).  In 1995, the legislature 
created the offense of Felony Driving While Intoxicated (a Class C offense) and 
assigned a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 days of incarceration for the first 
felony DWI.  § 28.35.030(n) (2006). 
For a more detailed description of sentencing structure, sentencing ranges, 
and other provisions, see JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY PROCESS: 1999, at 
35–37 (2004), available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/Fel99FullReport.pdf 
[hereinafter ALASKA FELONY PROCESS]. 
 33. § 12.55.155(f) (1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(f) 
(2006)).  With specific findings, a judge also could refer the case for sentencing to 
a three-judge panel that could impose the original presumptive sentence or any 
sentence within the statutory range. § 12.55.165 (1980) (current version at ALASKA 
STAT. § 12.55.165 (2006)). 
 34. See § 12.55.125(d)–(e) (1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT.  § 
12.55.125(d)–(e) (2006)). 
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time imposed.35 The legislation eliminated discretionary parole for 
those sentenced presumptively, at least during the period 
attributable to the presumptive sentence.36  The legislature made 
further changes that took effect in 198237 and 1983–1984.38 
Case law39 quickly built on the presumptive sentencing 
structure to set limits to the possible range of sentences for most 
first offenders.40  The legislation also codified the Chaney criteria.41 
Subsequent case law required judges to consider these factors at 
most points when they sentenced, whether they were looking at the 
magnitude of difference made by an aggravator or mitigator, at 
sentencing on a probation revocation, or at imposing the original 
sentence.42 
The 1980 sentencing statute’s opening “Declaration of 
Purpose” stated that “[t]he legislature finds that the elimination of 
unjustified disparity in sentences and the attainment of reasonable 
uniformity in sentences can best be achieved through a sentencing 
framework fixed by statute as provided in this chapter.”43  Later 
 
 35. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, §§ 20.020–20.025 (2007). 
 36. See § 12.55.125(g) (1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(g) 
(2006)).  Separate provisions could apply to the aggravated portions of sentences 
or consecutive sentences.  Id. 
 37. The major change in 1982 was including all drug offenses under the 
presumptive sentencing plan.  See, e.g., § 12.55.125(b) (1980) (current version at 
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(b) (2006)). 
 38. See id.  In 1983, the legislature revised the charging and sentencing 
structure for sexual offenses, increasing the penalties substantially.  § 12.55.125(i) 
(1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(i) (2006)). 
 39. The legislature created a court of appeals to handle only criminal cases, 
and the court began its work in late 1980. See Susanne D. DiPietro, The 
Development of Appellate Sentencing Law in Alaska, 7 ALASKA L. REV. 265, 276–
77 (1990). 
 40. Stern, supra note 28, at 255–66 (discussing Austin v. State, 627 P.2d 657 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam)). 
 41. See § 12.55.005 (1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005 
(2006)). 
 42. See, e.g., Bossie v. State, 835 P.2d 1257, 1258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (“The 
sentencing court must . . . determine whether this mitigating factor, analyzed in 
the light of the sentencing criteria contained in . . . State v. Chaney (citation 
omitted) calls for some adjustment of the presumptive term.”); State v. Wentz, 805 
P.2d 962, 964 (Alaska 1991) (“Applying the foregoing principles [derived from 
Chaney] to the case at bar, it is apparent that the trial court was permitted . . . to 
increase Wentz’s presumptive five-year term by as much as fifteen years, 
depending upon the number and severity of statutory aggravating factors 
present . . . .”). 
 43. § 12.55.005 (1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005 (2006)). 
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decisions from the court of appeals affirmed these purposes of the 
new sentencing scheme.44  The intent was to eliminate both the 
ethnicity-related disparities found in sentencing studies in the 1970s 
and the disparities based on the identity of the judge.45  Reviews of 
felony sentencing practices in 1980,46 1984–1987,47 and 199948  
showed that presumptive sentencing had apparently been 
successful at eliminating the disparities associated with the 
ethnicities of presumptively sentenced defendants.49  However, the 
1999 data showed disparities for Black and Native defendants in 
non-presumptive drug sentences.50 
IV.  ALASKA’S NEW  
SENTENCING SYSTEM, PRESUMPTIVE RANGES 
The new law sets a range of permissible sentences for each 
offense.  It expands the scope of presumptive sentencing to all 
felony convictions, including Class B and C first offenders.51  
Typically, the new ranges start at the previous presumptive 
sentence (if there was one) and go up to several years above that.52  
Mitigators can still be argued to reduce the sentence.53  Aggravators 
 
 44. See, e.g., Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823, 833 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) 
(“[U]nless a measured and restrained approach is taken in the adjustment of 
presumptive sentences . . . the potential for irrational disparity in sentencing 
would threaten to become reality . . . .”), modified and superceded, Juneby v. 
State, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). 
 45. See ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 29, at 40–41. 
 46. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCES: 1980 (1982), 
available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/akfel80.pdf [hereinafter ALASKA 
FELONY SENTENCES: 1980]. 
 47. Teresa White Carns & John Kruse, ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 
ALASKA’S PLEA BARGAINING BAN RE-EVALUATED at 149–52 (1991). 
 48. ALASKA FELONY PROCESS, supra note 32. 
 49. See, e.g., ALASKA FELONY SENTENCES: 1980, supra note 46, at 57 (“The 
present analysis of 1980 offenses reveals that racially disproportionate sentencing 
outcomes have been totally eliminated.”). 
 50. ALASKA FELONY PROCESS, supra note 32, at 1, 277. 
 51. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(e) (2006) (“[A] defendant convicted of a 
class C felony may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more 
than five years, and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following 
presumptive ranges . . . .”). 
 52. See infra Table: Alaska: Current Presumptive Terms Compared to 
Presumptive Ranges in Senate Bill 56. 
 53. E.g., § 12.55.125(d)(1) (“[T]he defendant is required to serve an active 
term of imprisonment within the range specified in this paragraph, unless the 
court finds . . . a mitigation factor . . . .”).  Aggravating and mitigating factors are 
located in ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 (2006). 
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that would take the sentence above the presumptive range must 
meet Blakely requirements.54 
The presumptive ranges are set out in the following table, with 
the new ranges in bold letters and the former presumptive sentence 
(if any) in parentheses.  Most felony convictions are for Class C 
and Class B offenses such as Thefts, Frauds, Misconduct Involving 
a Controlled Substance, and less serious assaults and sexual 
offenses.  First offenders in these categories now have presumptive 
ranges for their sentences, in addition to case law guidance.55  Class 
C first offenders have a range of zero to two years,56 and Class C 
sex offenders (who formerly had a typical range of zero to two 
years) have a presumptive one to two year range.57  Class B first 
offenders have a presumptive range of one to three years, similar 
to the previous “court-made law”58 that set one to three years as an 
appropriate sentencing range.  First offenders convicted of Class B 
sexual offenses now have a two to four-year presumptive range 
rather than the earlier one to three-year court-made law range.59 
The presumptive ranges apply to the total sentence imposed, 
including any suspended time.60 Active time (i.e., the amount of 
time that the defendant must spend incarcerated) and suspended 
time together cannot total more than the upper end of the 
presumptive range.61 The presumptive ranges for second and 
subsequent felony B and C offenders, and for all other offenders 
 
 54. See § 12.55.155. 
 55. See § 12.55.125(d) (Class B felonies); § 12.55.125(e) (Class C felonies). 
 56. § 12.55.125(e)(1). 
 57. See infra Table: Alaska: Current Presumptive Terms Compared to 
Presumptive Ranges in Senate Bill 56.  An interesting historical note is that the 
Supreme Court’s Sentencing Guidelines Committee that operated between 1978 
and 1982 drafted guidelines for first offender Class B and C offenders. The draft 
guidelines for Class C first offenders call for probation to sixty days for Property 
and Drug offenses without aggravating circumstances, and generally for a range of 
“probation to two (2) years.” For Class B offenders, the proposed range was 
probation to four years. The new presumptive range for Class B offenders is 
narrower than was the proposed guideline, but the Class C presumptive range is 
identical to the earlier proposal. The draft guidelines were not adopted, although 
the committee did adopt guidelines for drug offenses that were used from 1980 to 
1982.  Further information is available from the Alaska Judicial Council. 
 58. See infra Table: Alaska: Current Presumptive Terms Compared to 
Presumptive Ranges in Senate Bill 56. 
 59. Id. 
 60. § 12.55.125(n).  For sentences imposed consecutively or concurrently the 
new legislation specifies that “presumptive term” in that section now means the 
middle of the presumptive range.  § 12.55.127(d)(3) (2006). 
 61. § 12.55.125(n). 
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who were sentenced presumptively under the earlier law, begin at 
the former presumptive sentence and go up by varying amounts.  
The new ranges will permit judges to sentence anywhere within the 
range without calling upon aggravating or mitigating factors to 
justify their sentences. 
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An example will help clarify these changes.  A first felony 
offender convicted of one count of Robbery 1 with a weapon under 
the previous code (a Class A offense; see Table), who did not have 
any aggravating or mitigating factors would have had a 
presumptive sentence of seven years.62  The offender would have 
been eligible for release on good time after serving two-thirds of 
the sentence, assuming no discipline while incarcerated that would 
have reduced the amount of good time.  If the judge had wished to 
impose additional probationary time to provide longer supervision, 
he or she could not have done so without alleged and proven (by 
clear and convincing evidence) aggravators that would allow 
additional suspended time to serve.63 
Under the new presumptive ranges, the judge could sentence 
the same offender to any length of sentence within the seven-to 
eleven-year range.64  If the judge sentenced the offender to eight 
years of active time to serve, the judge could also impose up to 
three years of suspended time and require that the offender be 
supervised on probation for that period of time.65 
Statutory provisions for mitigators changed very little under 
the new legislation.  The legislature added two new mitigators,66 but 
it did not otherwise alter existing statutes.  The active time cannot 
go below the bottom of the range without allegation and proof by 
clear and convincing evidence of mitigating factors.67  If the low end 
 
 62. § 12.55.125(c)(2)(A) (2004) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 
12.55.125(c) (2006)). 
 63. See § 12.55.155 (2004) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 
(2006)). 
 64. § 12.55.125(c)(2)(A) (2006). 
 65. See § 12.55.125(o) (“[T]he court shall impose . . . (2) suspended 
imprisonment of three years and a minimum period of probation supervision of 10 
years for conviction of a class A or class B felony . . . .”). 
 66. The new mitigators allow the judge to decrease the sentence under some 
circumstances if the defendant is part of or has completed a state-approved 
treatment program, § 12.55.155(d)(17); additionally, the new mitigators permit a 
decrease in sentence for defendants who suffer “from a mental disease or 
defect . . . that significantly affected the defendant’s behavior but is not sufficient 
for a complete defense.”  § 12.55.155(d)(18).  Again, the mitigator can only be 
used under limited circumstances. 
 67. See § 12.55.155(d)(1) (“The following factors shall be considered by the 
sentencing court if proven in accordance with this section, and may allow 
imposition of a sentence below the presumptive range . . . .”). The judge also can 
refer the case for sentencing to a three-judge panel which may “in the interest of 
justice sentence the defendant to any definite term of imprisonment up to the 
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of the range is four years or less, the court may impose any 
sentence below the presumptive range for factors in mitigation 
(including probation).68  If the low end of the range is more than 
four years, the court can sentence up to fifty percent below the low 
end of the range.69 
The larger changes came in the provisions for aggravating 
offenses above the new presumptive ranges.  Aggravators now fall 
into two categories: those that must be proved to a jury70 and those 
that can still continue to be proved to the judge by clear and 
convincing evidence.71  In the latter category are the eight “prior 
conviction” aggravators excluded from the jury requirement by the 
Blakely decision.72  These include aggravators related to the 
number of the defendant’s prior felony convictions;73 the 
defendant’s probation, parole, release or furlough status;74 the 
defendant’s history of juvenile adjudications for adult felony 
equivalents;75 the defendant’s history of assaultive behavior and 
convictions of offenses similar to the current conviction;76 a history 
of more serious offenses;77 or a history of five or more convictions 
for Class A misdemeanors (a new aggravator added in the present 
legislation).78 
Aggravators that must be proved to a jury comprise all of the 
other aggravators specified in the prior statute and carried over in 
the new legislation.  Those factors for which the prosecutor seeks a 
sentence higher than the presumptive range must “be presented to 
a trial jury under procedures set by the court”79 and be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The prosecutor must give the 
 
maximum term provided for the offense or to any sentence authorized under AS 
12.55.015.” § 12.55.175(c). 
 68. § 12.55.155(a)(1). 
 69. § 12.55.155(a)(2). 
 70. § 12.55.155(f)(2). 
 71. § 12.55.155(f)(1). 
 72. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (“Other than the fact of a 
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 436, 490 (2000))). 
 73. § 12.55.155(c)(15). 
 74. § 12.55.155(c)(12), (20). 
 75. § 12.55.155(c)(19). 
 76. § 12.55.155(c)(21). 
 77. § 12.55.155(c)(7)–(8). 
 78. § 12.55.155(c)(31). 
 79. § 12.55.155(f)(2). The section also provides that the defendant can waive 
trial on the factor, can stipulate to the existence of the factor, or can consent to 
have the factor proven under the clear and convincing evidence standard.  Id. 
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defendant and court written notice “of the intent to establish a 
factor in aggravation.”80 
The aggravators that must go to a jury after March 23, 2005 
(without a waiver from the defendant) include approximately 
twenty-seven different situations specified in section 12.55.155.81  
Behavior that involved a group of three or more persons (with the 
defendant as the leader),82 organized groups of five or more 
persons,83 or gangs84 are all aggravating factors that must be proven 
to a jury.  Various aggravators involving financial remuneration 
from the offense such as a pecuniary incentive beyond that 
inherent in the offense85 or substantial monetary gain with little risk 
of prosecution and punishment86 must go to the jury.  Injury to a 
person other than an accomplice,87 the victim’s vulnerability,88 
domestic-related offenses,89 and involvement of minors90 also are 
among the aggravators subject to jury trial. 
Once the jury has accepted the aggravating factor as proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge fashions the sentence using 
the criteria established under existing law.  Even if the jury finds a 
guilty verdict on the aggravator, the judge is not obliged to impose 
a higher sentence.91  If the judge does decide to increase the 
sentence, further case law structures the decision by use of the 
Chaney criteria and various other case law limitations.92 
Most of the offenses set out in the criminal code retained the 
same statutory maximum penalties under the new law.  The 
changes that occurred, both in maximum penalties and in increased 
penalties and restrictions for some offenses, were unrelated to the 
Blakely provisions.  In particular, the laws governing penalties for 
sexual offenses were revised in 2005 and again in 2006.93 The 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. § 12.55.155. 
 82. § 12.55.155(c)(3). 
 83. § 12.55.155(c)(14). 
 84. § 12.55.155(c)(29). 
 85. § 12.55.155(c)(11). 
 86. § 12.55.155(c)(16). 
 87. § 12.55.155(c)(1). 
 88. § 12.55.155(c)(5). 
 89. § 12.55.155(c)(18). 
 90. § 12.55.155(c)(23)(B), 27(A)–(B). 
 91. See §12.55.155(c) (“The following factors shall be considered by the 
sentencing court if proven in accordance with this section, and may allow 
imposition of a sentence above the presumptive range set out in AS 12.55.125.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 92. See DiPietro, supra note 39, at 280 n.99. 
 93. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 Notes to Decisions (2006). 
01__CARNS.DOC 6/7/2007  3:18 PM 
14 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [24:1 
presumptive ranges set in 2005 were boosted substantially in 2006.94  
In addition, requirements for longer suspended sentences and 
probation terms for sexual offenses were imposed,95 and offenders 
were ordered to submit to polygraph testing under some 
circumstances.96 
V.  ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF THE BILL 
A. Reduction of disparities 
The Senate’s Letter of Intent,97 which was incorporated into 
the legislation, noted that the legislature intended to preserve “the 
basic structure of Alaska’s presumptive sentencing system, which is 
designed to avoid disparate sentences.”98  This language echoes that 
in the declaration of purpose in the 1978 legislation, “[t]he 
legislature finds that the elimination of unjustified disparity in 
sentences . . . can best be achieved through a sentencing framework 
fixed by statute.”99  The Judicial Council findings of unexplainable 
ethnic disparities in non-presumptive drug sentences in the 1999 
database would support the legislature’s continuing concern about 
disparities.100  Because the Council found no unwarranted 
disparities in presumptive sentences and the new system 
 
 94. See id. 
 95. § 12.55.125(o).  This provision was added by the 2006 amendments. § 
12.55.125 app. at 686. 
 96. See ALASKA STAT.  § 12.55.100(e) (2006). 
 97. The full text of the Letter of Intent is: 
It is the intent of the legislature in passing this bill to preserve the basic 
structure of Alaska’s presumptive sentencing system, which is designed 
to avoid disparate sentences. With this bill the legislature sets out a 
sentencing framework, subject to judicial adjustment for statutory 
aggravating or mitigating factors that are determined in a manner that is 
constitutional under the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in Blakely 
v.  Washington.  The single, definite presumptive terms set out in current 
law can unduly constrain the sentencing process, particularly under the 
mandates of Blakely v. Washington.  Although the presumptive terms 
are being replaced by presumptive ranges, it is not the intent of this bill 
in doing so to bring about an overall increase in the amount of active 
imprisonment for felony sentences.  Rather, the bill is intended to give 
judges the authority to impose an appropriate sentence, with an 
appropriate amount of probation supervision, by taking into account the 
considerations set out in  AS 12.55.005 [sic] and 12.55.015. ALASKA 
SENATE JOURNAL, S.24-56, 1st. Sess., at  0102–03 (2005) [hereinafter 
ALASKA SENATE JOURNAL]. 
 98. Id. at 0102. 
 99. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005 (1978) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 
12.55.005 (2006)). 
 100. ALASKA FELONY PROCESS, supra note 32, at 1. 
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emphasizes uniformity in the context of the presumptive ranges,101 
it could be anticipated that ranges might help to reduce sentencing 
disparity. 
B. Increased judicial discretion 
The Letter of Intent emphasized the legislature’s desire “to 
give judges the authority to impose an appropriate sentence.”102  
The need for more discretion for judges was emphasized in a news 
column by then-Attorney General Gregg Renkes which was 
published at about the same time that the bill was introduced.103  
Mr. Renkes characterized the Blakely decision as shifting “much of 
the decision-making in sentencing to jurors who probably serve on 
only one felony case in their lives, rather than judges who deal with 
felony sentencing every day . . . making it much more difficult for 
judges to give stiff sentences for aggravated crimes.”104 
C. No increase in sentence lengths 
The Senate Letter of Intent also noted that the legislature did 
not intend to increase the overall amount of active imprisonment.105  
When the Department of Corrections (DOC) submitted its second 
set of fiscal notes (analysis provided to the legislature about the 
fiscal impacts of bills that the legislature is considering), it said that 
it did not expect increased sentence lengths or added burdens for 
its work.106  To support its fiscal notes, the DOC cited its research 
that suggested that the average un-suspended incarceration for first 
felony Class B and C offenders fell within the middle of the new 
ranges.107  For 4097 Class C convicted offenders sentenced between 
January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2004, the DOC showed an 
average un-suspended incarceration of 366 days.108  The Table 
shows that the new range of sentences for first offender Class C 
 
 101. Id. at 3. 
 102. ALASKA SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 97, at 0103. 
 103. Gregg Renkes, Ruling Handcuffs Alaska’s Judges, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Jan. 19, 2005, at B4. 
 104. Id. 
 105. ALASKA SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 97, at 0103. 
 106. ALASKA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, FISCAL NOTE SIX, S.24-56, 1st. Sess., at 2 
(2005) [hereinafter FISCAL NOTE SIX]; ALASKA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, FISCAL 
NOTE SEVEN, S.24-56, 1st. Sess., at 2 (2005) [hereinafter FISCAL NOTE SEVEN]. 
 107. FISCAL NOTE SIX, supra note 106, at 1; FISCAL NOTE SEVEN, supra note 
106, at 1. 
 108. FISCAL NOTE SIX, supra note 106, at 2. 
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convictions was zero to two years.109  For Class B convictions, the 
new range was one to three years of un-suspended incarceration, 
and the results were similar to the previous sentences.110  DOC data 
showed a mean sentence of 864 days (2.4 years) for the 1155 
offenders between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2004.111 
A second source of data about average sentence lengths for 
Class B and C first offenders was the data underlying the Alaska 
Judicial Council’s report, Alaska Felony Process: 1999.112  Data 
from that report, submitted to the Alaska House Finance 
Committee on February 16, 2005,113 showed that the typical Class C 
first felony offender received a mean sentence of 163 days of un-
suspended incarceration.114  The first offender Class C felons in the 
Judicial Council data appeared to receive an average sentence of 
only about half of that in the DOC average.115  The Council’s data 
from 1999 showed a mean sentence of 609 days of un-suspended 
incarceration for Class B first felony offenders, or about fifty 
perent less than the DOC average.116  The differences between the 
two calculations of sentence length could be related to the different 
data sets used, or it could be related to increases in average 
sentences in cases filed after 1999. 
D. More suspended sentences accompanied by probation 
A Department of Law summary117 of the bill characterized the 
legislative intent language as “the legislature intended to give 
judges authority to impose suspended periods of incarceration.  
This is important because the legislature adopted presumptive 
ranges that start at the former presumptive term.”118  The 
 
 109. Supra Table: Alaska: Current Presumptive Terms Compared to 
Presumptive Ranges in Senate Bill 56. 
 110. Id. 
 111. FISCAL NOTE SIX, supra note 106, at 2. 
 112. ALASKA FELONY PROCESS, supra note 32. The Council used data about 
first felony B and C offenders included in the report’s database to report on 
lengths of mean sentences to the legislature. 
 113. Memorandum from the Alaska Judicial Council on Blakely Data to the 
House Finance Co-chairs (Feb. 16, 2005) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 
Alaska Judicial Council Memo]. 
 114. Id. at 5. 
 115. See FISCAL NOTE SIX, supra note 106, at 2. 
 116. See Alaska Judicial Council Memo., supra note 113, at 5; FISCAL NOTE SIX, 
supra note 106, at 2. 
 117. Summary of new legislation prepared by Department of Law (July 20, 
2005) (on file with author). 
 118. Id. 
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Department’s statement could have been drawing on the sentence 
in the legislative letter that says: “Rather, the bill is intended to 
give judges the authority to impose an appropriate sentence, with 
an appropriate amount of probation supervision.”119  The 
Department of Law phrase suggested that the department might 
expect increased suspended sentences, with longer probationary 
terms and greater exposure to the possibility of probation 
revocations.120  However, the Department of Law’s fiscal note 
submitted on January 21, 2005 says that the Department does not 
expect any increase in its own expenses associated with 
implementation of the new sentencing scheme.121 
E. Defense attorney concerns 
In the defense agencies’ fiscal notes,122 agency heads noted 
concerns about the probability of increasing sentence lengths, 
increasing overall incarceration, increasing numbers of defendants 
on probation (with an associated increase in probation 
revocations), and increasing appellate work.123 
VI.  ACTUAL EFFECTS OF BLAKELY 
A. Increased appeals 
The most noticeable effect of Blakely in 2004 and 2005 was a 
substantial increase in Blakely and Apprendi-related appellate 
work.  The clerk of the appellate courts estimated that the number 
of appeals had risen substantially in twelve months between July 1, 
2004 and June 30, 2005.124  In Fiscal Year 2004, the court of appeals 
had a total of 219 filed cases.125 For Fiscal Year 2005, the total had 
risen to an estimated 475 filed cases, a 117% increase during the 
year.126 
 
 119. ALASKA SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 97, at 0103. 
 120. See id. 
 121. ALASKA DEP’T OF LAW, FISCAL NOTE ONE, S.24-56, 1st. Sess., at 1 (2005) 
[hereinafter FISCAL NOTE ONE]. 
 122. ALASKA PUBLIC DEFENDER AGENCY, FISCAL NOTE EIGHT, S.24-56, 1st. 
Sess., at 1 (2005) [hereinafter FISCAL NOTE EIGHT]; ALASKA OFFICE OF PUBLIC 
ADVOCACY, FISCAL NOTE NINE, S.24-56, 1st. Sess., at 1 (2005) [hereinafter FISCAL 
NOTE NINE]. 
 123. FISCAL NOTE EIGHT, supra note 122, at 1; FISCAL NOTE NINE, supra note 
122, at 1. 
 124. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 51 (2006). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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Most of the increase was probably due to Blakely-related 
issues.127  The clerk’s office reviewed the cases on file during the 
summer of 2005 for Blakely or Apprendi issues.  In 191 files, one or 
both of these cases were mentioned by name.128  Those numbers 
could still underestimate the effect of Blakely and Apprendi 
because attorneys could have raised similar issues without 
specifically naming the cases. 
Appellate attorneys for both the Public Defender Agency and 
the Department of Law agreed that appeals had increased 
substantially.129  They suggested in interviews in 2005 that between 
150 and 200 cases were filed in Fiscal Year 2005 that focused on 
Blakely and Apprendi.130  Interviewed again in November 2006, 
defense attorneys and prosecutors perceived an undiminished rate 
of new appeals and a rapidly accumulating backlog.131  Attorneys 
continued to file appeals for a variety of reasons, despite a total of 
thirty-three separate appellate decisions on Blakely issues by 
November 2006.132 
Several reasons have been cited for the continued high rate of 
appeals.  Both prosecutors and defendants appeared unwilling to 
abandon Blakely arguments that were unsuccessful in the court of 
appeals until the Alaska Supreme Court has decided them.133  When 
federal grounds for relief were unsuccessful, new appeals have 
been filed based on state grounds.  If new federal issues were 
raised, attorneys seem to be continuing to file cases until the 
federal courts resolve the issues.  The prosecutors and defense 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Telephone Interview with Marilyn May, Clerk of the Appellate Courts 
(July 2005).  The data collection was possible because the court had one-time 
externs available to review the cases. The court does not routinely track appeals 
filed by the nature of the issues raised. 
 129. Telephone Interview with Quinlan Steiner, attorney, Pub. Defender 
Agency (June 10, 2005); Telephone Interviews with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t 
of Law (June 10, 2005 and Nov. 2006); Telephone Interview with Linda Wilson, 
attorney, Pub. Defender Agency (Nov. 2006). 
 130. Telephone Interview with Quinlan Steiner, attorney, Pub. Defender 
Agency (June 10, 2005); Telephone Interview with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t 
of Law (June 10, 2005). 
 131. Telephone Interview with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t of Law (Nov. 
2006); Telephone Interview with Linda Wilson, attorney, Pub. Defender Agency 
(Nov. 2006). 
 132. Telephone Interview by Larry Cohn with Linda Wilson, attorney, Pub. 
Defender Agency (Nov. 2006). 
 133. Telephone Interview by Larry Cohn with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t of 
Law (Nov. 2006). 
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attorneys noted that the amount of continuing appellate work 
generated by Blakely has strained already limited resources.134 
B. Smart v. State 
On October 27, 2006, the court of appeals decided Smart v. 
State.135  The court held that Blakely’s requirement of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt was essential “to a fair and lawful 
determination of a defendant’s sentence under Alaska’s 
presumptive sentencing law,”136 and had to be applied 
retroactively.137  The court also decided that Alaska’s retroactivity 
law applied, rather than the federal law,138 and that the defendant 
was entitled to a jury decision on aggravators.139 
The Alaska Judicial Council calculated the number of 
offenders who might still be incarcerated in June 2007, based on 
the data in its report on 1999 felony charges.  Extrapolating from 
the 1999 offenders and using the court system’s annual reports to 
estimate increases in felony filings, the Council estimated that 
about 120 offenders were likely to still be incarcerated who might 
qualify for relief of some sort under Smart.  Some of those 
offenders would not qualify because their aggravating factors were 
prior convictions or other factors that would not qualify for Blakely 
relief.  The Council did not estimate how many more offenders 
charged before 1999 might still be incarcerated and might qualify 
for relief under Smart, nor did it estimate how many offenders who 
were on probation or parole would qualify for reductions in 
suspended sentences and probation periods.140 
The Department of Law asked the court of appeals to stay the 
retroactive application of Blakely while it petitioned the Alaska 
Supreme Court to reverse the Smart decision.141  The Public 
Defender Agency did not file an opposition to the request for the 
 
 134. Telephone Interview by Larry Cohn with Linda Wilson, attorney, Pub. 
Defender Agency (Nov. 2006); Telephone Interview by Larry Cohn with Doug 
Kossler, attorney, Dep’t of Law (Nov. 2006). 
 135. Smart v. State, 146 P.3d 15 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
 136. Id. at 17. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 27. A sizable part of the opinion was devoted to discussing the 
Teague test used in federal habeas corpus litigation and why it did not apply to this 
situation. 
 139. Id. at 35. 
 140. Further information available from the author. 
 141. Telephone Interview with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t of Law (Nov. 
2006). 
01__CARNS.DOC 6/7/2007  3:18 PM 
20 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [24:1 
stay, but it did oppose the State’s petition.142  It also was preparing 
its own petition to the supreme court for a review of portions of the 
Smart decision.143  The appellate court clerk reported that the court 
of appeals had stayed 256 appeals, another indication of its current 
Blakely-related caseload.144 
C. Trial court effects 
1. Jury trials for aggravators.  Trial attorneys interviewed for 
this comment reported very few jury trials on Blakely 
aggravators.145  In Fiscal Year 2004 (July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004), 
the court showed 142 felony jury trials, which was 3.3% of all of the 
felony cases filed.146  In Fiscal Year 2005 (July 1, 2004 to June 30, 
2005), the 151 jury trials were 2.9% of all felonies filed.147  These 
data do not suggest that at least during the first year after the 
decision, the trial courts experienced any effects from new jury 
trials related to Blakely.148 
2. Other trial court filings related to Blakely.  Attorneys also 
commented about other forms of litigation in the trial courts.  Most 
cases in the trial courts after June 24, 2004 have already received 
the benefits of Blakely.  Original actions for relief will be much 
reduced as time passes.149  Attorneys did suggest that if the Alaska 
Supreme Court upholds Smart, the trial courts will see substantial 
new work.150  If Smart is upheld and the currently-stayed cases are 
 
 142. Telephone Interview with Linda Wilson, attorney, Pub. Defender Agency 
(Nov. 2006). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Telephone Interview with Marilyn May, Clerk of the Appellate Courts 
(Nov. 2006). 
 145. Interview information available from author. 
 146. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT S-28 (2005). 
 147. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT S-28 (2006). 
 148. Data for Fiscal Year 2006 felony jury trials were not available from the 
court at the time this comment was prepared.  However, the trend in felony jury 
trials as a percentage of felony cases filed has gone steadily downward.  In Fiscal 
Year 2003, jury trials were 3.5% of all felony cases filed. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 
2003 ANNUAL REPORT S-28 (2004).  In Fiscal Year 2002, they were 4.3%.  
ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT S-28 (2003). 
 149. Telephone Interview with Quinlan Steiner, attorney, Pub. Defender 
Agency (June 10, 2005); Telephone Interviews with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t 
of Law (June 10, 2005 and Nov. 2006); Telephone Interview with Linda Wilson, 
attorney, Pub. Defender Agency (Nov. 2006). 
 150. Telephone Interviews with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t of Law (Nov. 
2006); Telephone Interview with Linda Wilson, attorney, Pub. Defender Agency 
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remanded to the trial courts for relief, attorneys and judges will be 
kept busy determining the appropriate response for each offender. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The discussion of Blakely continues to affect much of the 
appellate caseload, but it seems to have less effect on trial courts 
and trial attorneys.  At this time, attorneys throughout the state 
debate a wide variety of issues.  Some of the issues are legal: Will 
the supreme court uphold Smart?  How will Alaska’s courts finally 
resolve the other Blakely and Apprendi issues?  Will the new law, 
once subjected to appellate scrutiny, be found constitutional?  Will 
it comply with the Blakely requirements?  Will the Booker151 case 
eventually be found to apply to Alaska sentencing law?152 
Other issues are more tied to agency and system caseloads and 
effects.  Two and one-half years after the Blakely decision, the 
question of increases in active sentence lengths has not been 
researched.  Anecdotally, attorneys believe that judges are 
imposing more suspended time and probation.  One question is 
whether petitions to revoke probation will increase because 
offenders are subject to increasing probation supervision.  Until the 
higher appellate courts have an opportunity to review some of the 
court of appeals decisions and until actual sentences imposed can 
be researched, many of the questions will remain. 
 
(Nov. 2006).  Attorneys said that they were continuing to file new appeals.  
Consequently, the number of stayed cases is likely to grow while the supreme 
court is considering the petitions. 
 151. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  The Court found the federal 
sentencing guidelines unconstitutional based on its decision in Blakely; its remedy 
was to declare the guidelines voluntary. 
 152. Wool, supra note 28, at 3.  Based upon the Booker decision, the author 
observed that “[b]ecause the rulings in the remedial opinion are not based in the 
Constitution but in the Court’s interpretation of the relevant federal statutes, they 
have no binding effect on state systems. The states are free to choose a different 
course, as is Congress.” 
